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ARTICLE
What-If at Waterloo. Carl von Clausewitz’s use of
historical counterfactuals in his history of the
Campaign of 1815
Paul Schuurman
Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In this article, I analyze the use of historical counterfactuals in the Campaign of
1815 by Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Such is the importance of counter-
factuals in this work that its gist can be given in a series of 25 counterfactuals. I
claim that a central role is played by evaluative counterfactuals. This speciﬁc
form of counterfactuals is part of a didactic method that allows Clausewitz to
teach young oﬃcers a critical method that prepares them for the challenge of
decision-making in real warfare. I conclude with the enduring relevance of
Clausewitz’s use of evaluative counterfactuals for contemporary military
historiography.
KEYWORDS Clausewitz; historical counterfactuals; military historiography; Napoleon; Battle of
Waterloo
Introduction
In his Campaign of 1815, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) makes the follow-
ing remark about Napoleon after his victory at Ligny against the Prussians
on 16 June 1815: ‘If Bonaparte had followed with the main army, he would
have been ready to ﬁght at Wavre early on the 18th, and it is doubtful
whether Blücher would have been in a position to accept a battle at that
time and place, and even more doubtful that Wellington could have rushed
over in time.’1 Clausewitz uses a historical counterfactual, which can be
deﬁned as a proposition of the form ‘If antecedent A had been the case,
consequent C would have been the case.’ This counterfactual uses the
perfect tense. Strictly speaking, a counterfactual can also be formulated in
CONTACT Paul Schuurman schuurman@fwb.eur.nl
1Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Feldzug von 1815. Strategische Uebersicht des Feldzugs von 1815 in Clausewitz,
Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe’, in Werner Hahlweg (ed.), Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz-,
Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau- Nachlaß sowie aus öﬀentlichen und privaten Sammlungen, vol. II. 2
(=Feldzug), § 51, 1079. English translation: On Waterloo. Clausewitz, Wellington and the Campaign
of 1815, transl. and ed. Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran and Gregory W. Pedlow (s. l. Clausewitz.
com, 2010) (=Campaign) p. 186. Another translation is Carl von Clausewitz, On Wellington, transl. and
ed. Peter Hofschröer (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010). The translation of quotations
from other works besides the Feldzug von 1815 is mine, unless stated otherwise.
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the imperfect tense: ‘If antecedent A were the case, consequent C would be
the case.’2 In this article, I will concentrate on counterfactuals in the perfect
tense, i.e., I will concentrate on historical counterfactuals.
Historical counterfactuals ﬁgure in the earliest military historiography and
onward; Thucidides and Livy already wondered what their societies would
have looked like if the Persians had defeated the Greeks or if Alexander the
Great had turned his army toward Rome.3 Given this omnipresence, it would
seem that historical counterfactuals have important functions, although
debate about their use is by no means resolved, and already Leibniz sub-
jected the concept to trenchant skepticism.4 Nevertheless, especially since
the publication of David Lewis’s classical study Counterfactuals (1973), large
strides have been made toward an increasingly sophisticated philosophical
analysis of the functionality of various types of counterfactuals, including
historical counterfactuals.5 These results can be used to obtain a deeper
understanding of the speciﬁc functionality of speciﬁc types of historical
counterfactuals in the works of individual historians, provided that due
attention is paid to the historical and historiographical context of their
works. In the present article, I discuss Clausewitz’s use of historical counter-
factuals in his historical analysis of the Waterloo campaign; I place his
preference for evaluative counterfactuals in the wider theoretical context
provided by On War; and I conclude with the relevance of Clausewitz’s
discussion of counterfactuals for contemporary military historiography.
But why Clausewitz and why the Waterloo campaign? Clausewitz’s work
on On War, written during the last 15 years of his life, was preceded and
accompanied by studies on military history. He took constant care to for-
mulate a general theory of war that remained close to the diversity of
historical experience. He was interested in attempts to integrate universality
with particularity and was possibly inﬂuenced by Montesquieu, either
directly, or through his mentor Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813).6
Clausewitz analyzed the campaigns of Frederick the Great and other early
modern battles, but he was most interested in the more recent battles of the
French Revolution and Napoleon, in many of which he had participated
2Cf. David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell 1973), 1–4; Peter Menzies, ‘Counterfactual Theories
of Causation,’ The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/causation-counterfactual/>.
3See Gavriel Rosenﬁeld, ‘Why Do We Ask “What if?” Reﬂections on the Function of Alternate History’,
History and Theory 41 (2002), 91; Simon T. Kaye, ‘Challenging Certainty: The Utility and History of
Counterfactualism’, History and Theory 49 (2010), 45–46; Martin Bunzl, ‘Counterfactual History: A
User’s Guide’, American Historical Review 109 (2004), 846.
4Rosenﬁeld, ‘Why Do We Ask “What if?”’, 90–103; Kaye, ‘Challenging Certainty,’ 42; Richard J. Evans,
Altered Pasts. Counterfactuals in History (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press 2013), 125.
5See, among others, Noel Hendrickson, ‘Counterfactual Reasoning and the Problem of Selecting
Antecedent Scenarios,’ Synthese 185 (2012), 365–386 and Menzies, ‘Counterfactual Theories of
Causation,’ passim.
6Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2001), 169, 191, 195.
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himself. His most interesting historical works were written after his appoint-
ment as director of the Berlin Kriegsakademie in 1818. In 1831, the revolu-
tionary crisis saw him return to active duty in Posen, where he fell victim to
the great cholera epidemic 1 year later. The last work in his hands was
probably not the unﬁnished On War but his rather hastily ﬁnished history of
the French campaigns in Italy and Switzerland of 1799.7
The importance of Clausewitz’s historical works for the development of his
military theory has been widely appreciated, and of these historical works the
Campaign of 1815 ranks especially high.8 It was written between 1827 and 1830
and he used its material to teach Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia.9
While Clausewitz had still treated historical description and critical analysis sepa-
rately in his account of the campaign of France of 1814, his account of themilitary
events of 1815 achieves an exemplary and seamless integration of description
and analysis in 57 short sections. Andreas Herberg-Rothe sees a direct connection
betweenClausewitz’s analysis ofWaterloo andhis famousmature appreciation of
the relation between war and politics.10 Indeed, the Campaign of 1815 contains
many concepts that are developed at a more abstract level inOnWar. This holds
true for the ideas of friction and the culmination point of an attack; and, most
signiﬁcantly, the same point can also be made for historical counterfactuals.11
Moreover, the Battle of Waterloo itself made a career as the historical
counterfactual par excellence from the moment when Arthur Wellesley, Duke
of Wellington, famously observed that the outcome had been ‘the nearest
run thing you ever saw in your life,’ until the fatal shots ﬁred at Sarajevo on
28 June 1914 provided the world with another counterfactual paradigm.12
The counterfactual of a French victory at Waterloo was used in 1907 by G.M.
Trevelyan and other authors as the starting point for a full-ﬂedged ‘alternate’
history.13 Finally, the Waterloo campaign sees a remarkable combination of
7Eberhard Kessel, ‘Zur Genesis der modernen Kriegslehre. Die Entstehungsgeschichte von Clausewitz’
Buch “Vom Kriege”’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (1953), 418–423; Peter Paret, Clausewitz and
the State. The Man, His Theories and His Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2007), 328–330;
Werner Hahlweg, ‘Vorbemerkung’ to Carl von Clausewitz, 'Feldzug von 1815. Strategische Uebersicht
des Feldzugs von 1815 in Clausewitz, Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe', in Werner Hahlweg
(ed.), Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz-, Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau- Nachlaß sowie aus öﬀentlichen
und privaten Sammlungen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1990), vol. II. 2, 936–937.
8 DanielMoran, ‘Clausewitz onWaterloo: Napoleon at Bay’, in Christopher Bassford, DanielMoran and Gregory
W. Pedlow (transl. and eds.), On Waterloo. Clausewitz, Wellington and the Campaign of 1815 (s. l. Clausewitz.
com 2010), 241; Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 329; Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz. A New
Approach to On War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas 2008), 136; Bruno Colson, ‘Clausewitz on
Waterloo’, War in History 19 (2012), 400; and, especially, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle. The
Political Theory of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 32–38 and 79–85.
9Christopher Bassford, ‘Introduction’ to Campaign, 6; Moran, ‘Clausewitz on Waterloo’ in Campaign, 237;
Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle, 37 dates the writing of the Campaign of 1815 to 1827–1828.
10Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle, 83–84.
11Friction: Feldzug § 33, 1013–1014; culmination: Feldzug § 33, 1012.
12Quoted in Moran, ‘Clausewitz on Waterloo’ in Campaign, 253.
13George Macaullay Trevelyan, ‘If Napoleon Had Won the Battle of Waterloo,’ in Clio, a Muse, and Other
Essays Literary and Pedestrian (London: Longmans, Green 1913), 184–200. See also Kaye, ‘Challenging
Certainty,’ 48.
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the same persons in multiple ‘counterfactual roles.’ Napoleon was not only
the object of many counterfactuals but also made avid use of these proposi-
tions himself when, in the deadly torpor of St. Helena, he dictated Mémoires
that were specially dedicated to the Waterloo campaign.14 Clausewitz parti-
cipated in the campaign as chief of staﬀ of the Prussian corps that pinned
down Marshal Grouchy at Wavre.15 In addition, he wrote the counterfactuals
in his own account often in a direct reaction against those of Napoleon,
whose Mémoires in many ways set a polemic agenda for Clausewitz. Finally,
Wellington was one of the main actors in the military drama, the recipient of
some major criticism from Clausewitz, and also the writer of a reaction
against this criticism, in which he scornfully rejects the latter’s frequent
use of counterfactuals – immediately after having employed an extensive
counterfactual himself.16
Description: the Waterloo campaign in 25 counterfactuals
Clausewitz starts his account of the extraordinary events that saw Napoleon
escape from his exile on Elba and march across France, on 20 March 1815 – the
day Napoleon triumphantly entered Paris and King Louis XVIII took refuge to
Ghent. Napoleon started the ‘Hundred Days’ with energetic attempts at internal
paciﬁcation and with preparations for the inevitable clash with the coalition of
four great powers that had defeated him and forced him to abdication in the
previous year. An Anglo-Dutch and a Prussian army would enter the southern
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands soon, and Austrian and Russian armies
were on their way to other parts of the French frontier (the Seventh Coalition).
Clausewitz concentrates onNapoleon’smilitary preparations and the subsequent
Waterloo campaign, but henever loses sight of theprecarious political context for
the Emperor’s last military adventure. The Campaign of 1815 is positively bristling
with historical counterfactuals. It is possible to summarize Clausewitz’s history of
the campaign in the form of a series of counterfactuals, which is what I shall do
here, with each counterfactual preceded by a number between square brackets.
[1] If Napoleon had imposed general conscription for all male French citizens
between the ages of 20 and 60, he would have had a considerable force of over
2,000,000 soldiers. [2] Yet, this measure would only have worked if he had
suﬃcient equipment and if the French had stood uniﬁed and enthusiastically
behind him. His own Mémoires, as Clausewitz is keen to point out, show that he
entertained grave doubts on each of these conditions; hence he rejected this
14Napoléon, Mémoires pour servir À l’histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de La bataille de Mont-
Saint-Jean (Paris: Barrois 1820); see also Evans, Altered Pasts, 3; Moran, ‘Clausewitz on Waterloo’ in
Campaign, 253.
15See Donald Stoker, Clausewitz. His Life and Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 223–253.
16Wellington, ‘Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo’, in Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran and
Gregory W. Pedlow (transl. and eds.) On Waterloo. Clausewitz, Wellington and the Campaign of 1815
(s. l. Clausewitz.com 2010), 219–35.
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option.17 Napoleon also considered the possibility of a defensive strategy that
would have seen France invaded by the forces of the Coalition, but would have
given him extra time to reinforce, make use of French fortiﬁcations, and possibly
incite his citizens to a patriotic insurrection. [3] But a foreign invasion would have
further compoundedhis already extremely perilous internal political situation. His
Mémoires clearly testify that he felt this danger through and through; hence, it is
not surprising that he rejected this option as well.18 So, Napoleon had no other
option than an oﬀensive operation with an army that numbered 129,000 men
against his nearest enemies, the 99,000 soldiers of the Anglo-Dutch under
Wellington and the 115,000 Prussians under Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher –
in that sense he took the right decision. [4] Yet, his chances of success were
exceedingly slim and even a resounding blow against the English and Prussians
would still have left the possibility of defeat at the hands of the Austrians and the
Russians. [5] But if Napoleon had managed to crush Wellington and Blücher, he
would have been able to spare troops to counter the Austrians and the Russians
while drawing on the vast capabilities of an energized and reunited France. The
overall odds would still remain against him, but this would have given him a real
chance to take on the Coalition.19 Given Napoleon’s urgent need for success
against both the Anglo-Dutch and the Prussians, and given the well-known
energetic way in which he waged his campaigns, Wellington and Blücher should
have tried harder to combine their forces. [6] Given his need for a resounding
victory, Napoleonwould have attacked them anyway, even if he had been forced
to confront them jointly. [7] But even if it had been obvious to both allied
commanders that such a combination of forces was possible, it still would not
have happened becauseWellingtonwas unduly preoccupiedwith the continued
possession of Brussels. This ﬁxation prompted him to deploy his troops in a wide
area south of the city, screening its multiple approaches.20
On the night of 14–15 June, the Coalition forces were surprised to learn that
Napoleon was on the move and poised to strike in the direction of Charleroi,
which was taken on the 15th. Napoleon had managed to insert himself between
the Anglo-Dutch in the northwest, and the Prussians in the northeast. On the
16th, he sentMarshal Neywith 48,000men to take and guardQuatre Bras against
the Anglo-Dutch and decided to use his remaining 75,000 men against the
Prussians, whom he attacked and beat, but did not destroy, at Ligny that same
day (see Figure 1). [8] ThePrussianGeneral Bülowhad remained too long in Liege,
although he had received timely marching orders and would have been able to
reach Ligny 12 hours earlier than he actually did, just in time to decide the battle
in favor of the Prussians.21 [9] Similarly, Wellington had been able to send
17Feldzug § 5, 953; Napoléon, Mémoires, 51–65.
18Feldzug § 7, 956–958; Napoléon, Mémoires, 59–60.
19Feldzug § 14, 971–972.
20Feldzug § 15, 974.
21Feldzug § 20, 980.
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reinforcements that could have reached Ligny in time, again deciding the battle
in favor of the Coalition, but he continued his passive defense of the approaches
to Brussels.22 [10] On the French side, Napoleon maintained in hisMémoires that
hehadorderedNey to send10,000men fromQuatre Bras to Ligny; in thatway the
Prussians would have been surrounded, and Napoleon boasted that they would
have been taken en ﬂagrant délit.23 [11] Clausewitz does not agree: if Napoleon
had really had this aim, hewould have given clear and timely orders, but proof for
such orders is conspicuously absent.24 [12] And even if Ney had appeared with
10,000men in theopen territory around Ligny, thenBlücherwouldprobably have
been able to free part of his 80,000 men for countermeasures.25 [13] Clausewitz
also notes that if Ney had possessed complete knowledge of the situation, he
would have realized that he actuallywas able to drive away theAnglo-Dutch from
Quatre Bras and then fall on the rightwing of the Prussians at Ligny in full force, all
on 16 June.26
After the Battle of Ligny, Blücher, with his forces batteredbut still intact, started
a diﬃcult retreat in the northern direction of Wavre with the aim of joining forces
with Wellington. Napoleon maintains in his Mémoires that he was aware of this
maneuver, but Clausewitz retorts that [14] if he had indeed guessed this move-
ment, he would not have sent merely 35,000 men under Marshal Grouchy to go
after the Prussians.27 [15] Actually, if Napoleon had followed the Prussians swiftly
and with all his forces, and forced them to another battle, it is doubtful whether
they would have been able to survive this second onslaught, and even more
doubtful whether the Anglo-Dutchwould have arrived in time to save their allies.
In that way, Napoleon could have decided the entire campaign.28 [16] But even
without such a major shift in Napoleon’s operations, it still remains true that if he
really had guessed the direction of Blücher’s retreat, it would have been more
natural (natürlicher) to post a strong corps on the left bank of the Dyle. [17] If a
corps had been placed there, it would have been able to prevent the Prussians
from joining the Anglo-Dutch at Waterloo while at the same time being available
to help Napoleon in his decisive battle against the Anglo-Dutch.29 Napoleon
would later maintain that it had been his plan all along for Grouchy to come to
his aid against the Anglo-Dutch, and that [18] if Grouchy had followed his orders
correctly, he would have arrived in time at the battleﬁeld of Waterloo, thus
deciding the battle in favor of the French.30 Clausewitz remarks that there is
again no proof in the form of any clear order for this, and [19] if this had indeed
22Feldzug § 21, 980–981.
23Napoléon, Mémoires, 93–94, 100; Feldzug § 30, 996.
24Feldzug § 31, 997–1000 and idem § 36, 1023
25Feldzug § 31, 1001.
26Feldzug § 36, 1023–1024.
27Napoléon, Mémoires, 115–117; Feldzug § 37, 1025–1026.
28Feldzug § 51, 1079–1081.
29Feldzug § 37, 1026.
30Napoléon, Mémoires, 107–115, 142–158, 197.
6 P. SCHUURMAN
been Napoleon’s intention, he should have taken care from the start to keep
Grouchy between himself and the Prussians, not behind the Prussians.31 In the
event, Grouchy ﬁrstmissed the Prussians and then ended upwith a battle against
their rear guard on 18 June atWavre, while their regrouped and replenishedmain
force was able to partake in the battle against Napoleon at Waterloo that
same day.
Meanwhile, Napoleon had used 17 June to push on in the direction of
Wellington, and 18 June saw his army near Waterloo, pitched against the
Anglo-Dutch, who later that day would be reinforced by the Prussians
(see Figure 2). Napoleon opened his attack as late as 2:00 p.m. He could
have attacked between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. Why did he think that he
could aﬀord to wait? Because he did not believe that Wellington would
be able to bring in any more additional troops, and also because he did
not expect Blücher to come to Wellington’s aid that afternoon. Napoleon
was right in the ﬁrst assumption and his miscalculation in the second
assumption did not matter very much; [20] if he had attacked earlier,
then Blücher in his turn probably would have found ways to appear
earlier as well, so that it would still have been hard for Napoleon to
win at Waterloo. So neither assumption had much impact on the ﬁnal
outcome of the battle. Yet, Napoleon’s decision should be judged on the
basis of his assumptions at that moment. His arguments for these
assumptions were defective in both cases.32
The French concentrated their attack during the Battle of Waterloo on
Wellington’s centre, which however they did not manage to break. [21] If
they had rather concentrated on Wellington’s left wing, which was relatively
weak and exposed by open terrain, the chances of success would have
seemed higher.33 [22] But this would probably have resulted in an attack
on the French rear by a sizable detachment of Prussian reinforcements, and
this would actually have been the worst rather than the best option. [23] If
Napoleon had included the timely arrival of the Prussians on the battleﬁeld
in his plans, as indeed he should have, then he should have tried an attack
on the Anglo-Dutch right wing, even although this wing proﬁted from
depressions in the landscape.34 [24] In that case, the Anglo-Dutch would
still have been supported by the Prussians, and an Anglo-Dutch rout would
still have been unlikely; but perhaps the combined coalition forces might
have suﬀered a similar blow as the Prussians had suﬀered 2 days earlier at
Ligny; perhaps this setback would have caused hesitation and discord in the
allied command; perhaps in this constellation Grouchy’s arrival a day later
might have had an additional eﬀect; and perhaps this would have marked
31Feldzug § 48, 1053–1059.
32Ibid., 1052.
33Ibid., 1066.
34Ibid., 1067.
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the beginning of more sizable results for the French.35 [25] As it was, the
fatal outcome of Napoleon’s late and uncoordinated attack against the
Anglo-Dutch center during the Battle of Waterloo would probably not
have been reversed even if Grouchy had arrived in time on the battleﬁeld
of Waterloo. Since the Prussians would have managed to send in troops as
well, the cataclysm for the French would have been all the more
comprehensive.36 Clausewitz notes with grim satisfaction that this time it
was the turn of ‘the great magician’ himself to be taken en ﬂagrant délit –
not in a historical counterfactual, but for real.37
Analysis of the function of counterfactuals in the Campaign of 1815
In his critical analysis of the Battle of Ligny, Clausewitz excuses the modest
performance of the Prussians and their commanders with the remark that
action in war is like moving in a heavy element, so that even the most
mediocre results demand uncommon capabilities. This remark about the
debilitating eﬀect of friction (which also appears in On War) is used to
emphasize the function of criticism: it should try to assess the truth, not
exercise the function of a judge.38 Peter Paret indeed used this observation
to stress that Clausewitz ‘considered judgment in the sense of approval and
disapproval to be (. . .) inﬁnitely less signiﬁcant than understanding what had
occurred.’39 I do not agree with this verdict and I think that, in spite of this
isolated remark, Clausewitz is very much interested in passing judgment on
the choices and actions of the main actors. He constantly hands out praise
and blame, implicitly or explicitly. Keywords that appear again and again in
this context are ‘to forgive’ (verzeihen) and, especially, ‘to blame’ (tadeln).
The Campaign of 1815 was composed by an oﬃcer who participated in the
events himself and who evaluates the performance of his fellow oﬃcers. For
instance, he notes that the Coalition was still in the dark about Napoleon’s
whereabouts until 14 June and that it remained too long in a condition of
‘blameworthy indecision’ (tadelnswerther Schwebe). The Coalition had an –
admittedly – vague sense of danger and yet it managed to be completely
surprised by the lightning action of the Emperor.40 And when Clausewitz
discusses Napoleon’s decision to continue the Battle of Waterloo in spite of
the arrival of the Prussians on the battleﬁeld, he adds that he cannot be
blamed. Given his extremely vulnerable political internal and international
situation, he had to persevere against all odds – it is not without some
35Ibid.
36Feldzug § 50, 1075.
37Ibid., 1087.
38Feldzug § 33, 1014; cf. Vom Kriege I. 7, 263.
39Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 349, 354.
40Feldzug § 18, 978.
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admiration that Clausewitz adds: ‘there are situations when the greatest
prudence can only be sought in the greatest boldness, and Bonaparte’s
situation was one of them.’41 Since the expression of approval and disap-
proval is so important for Clausewitz, it is not surprising that a large part of
his counterfactuals can be understood in this light.42
When Clausewitz uses evaluative counterfactuals, his aim is frequently
the assessment of responsibility, often in a direct reaction against
Napoleon himself. In his Mémoires, the Emperor constantly tried to shift
the blame for the indecisive nature of the Battle at Ligny to Ney [10] and
the disaster at Waterloo to Grouchy [18] who, Napoleon maintains, failed
to follow his orders. Clausewitz counters these counterfactual arguments
in two diﬀerent ways. Firstly, he notes that both are based on the
assumption that Napoleon issued the orders in the ﬁrst place; but
Clausewitz denies that these orders were given, and without proof of
their existence the ramiﬁcations of their nonexecution become vacuous.
Moreover, in both cases, Clausewitz formulates his refutation in the form
of a new counterfactual, so that [11] reacts against [10] and [19] reacts
against [18]. From a morphological point of view, counterfactual [19] is
especially interesting: if Napoleon had indeed intended to use Grouchy’s
help at Waterloo before the arrival of the Prussians, then he should have
taken care to keep Grouchy between himself and the Prussians. Usually
both the antecedent and the consequent of a counterfactual take the
form of a false event (i.e., an event that did not take place), but in this
case only the antecedent is a (false) event. The consequent is not factual
but deontological; ‘Napoleon should have.’
Clausewitz’s second mode of attack is to allow for a moment the truth
of Napoleon’s counterfactuals, but to deny their relevance and hence
their success in shifting the blame away from the Emperor to his sub-
ordinates. The eﬀect of Clausewitz’s argument is again exculpation of Ney
[12] and Grouchy [25], and hence inculpation of Napoleon. Even if his
supposed orders had been obeyed, the result would still have been
unsatisfactory, given the impact of his other, more fundamental errors.
Both counterfactuals have again an intriguing morphology. Rather than
the usual case of an antecedent and a consequent that are both false, in
these cases we have an antecedent fact that is indeed false, but a
consequent is not false but true: ‘even if Grouchy had arrived in good
time on the battleﬁeld (not a fact), Napoleon would still have lost at
Waterloo (a fact).’ Nelson Goodman has called these partial
41Feldzug §48, 1070/Campaign, 177.
42See the counterfactuals [2], [3], [6], [7], [8], [11], [12], [14], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [23] [24], and
[25].
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counterfactuals semifactuals, which typically have the form ‘even if . . .
then still’ rather than ‘if . . . then.’43
This second mode of attack on Napoleon’s attempts at self-justiﬁcation
points to the importance of the (un)availability of alternative options and
alternative outcomes to an historical actor. These factors are highly relevant
if we want to judge the person in question. Clausewitz seems to subscribe to
the common assumption that the potential for praise and blame will be
higher to the extent that an actor had more options that were able to
produce more diﬀerent outcomes, and vice versa. Since he adheres to this
assumption about evaluative verdicts in general, it is not surprising that this
assumption also informs his use of evaluative counterfactuals. Blame is often
assigned in the form of a counterfactual that points to the availability of a
diﬀerent option that could have led to better outcomes. Wellington would
have been able to send reinforcements to the Battle at Ligny and this could
have decided the ﬁght in favor of the Coalition, but he took the culpable
decision to remain passive [9].44 On the other hand, Napoleon’s options
after his return from Elba were very limited. The chances of success of an
oﬀensive military campaign against the assembling Seventh Coalition were
very small, and even complete success against the Anglo-Dutch and the
Prussians would still have left the gathering Russians and Austrians unaf-
fected [4]; but a defensive campaign would have been fraught with (political)
dangers as well [3]. The combination of [3] and [4] amounts to a semifactual:
the alternative antecedent (a defensive versus an oﬀensive campaign) is
given the same likely consequent (a defeat for Napoleon) as the actual
antecedent. This semifactual is used to excuse Napoleon’s actual choice.
But this is merely a simpliﬁed sketch of Clausewitz’s approach. He realizes
very well that a fair counterfactual evaluation of his actors should not be
based exclusively or even primarily on their objective options and the
related outcomes, but rather on their own perceptions and evaluations. He
tries to present an analysis of the aims and means of the main historical
actors that is based on their own situational knowledge. Only with this
information does he feel safe to pronounce evaluative judgments. And
here again, historical counterfactuals are used to elucidate the options of
the historical actors in question. At the start of the Hundred Days, Napoleon
considered the option of a general conscription. This would have provided
him with a very large army of some 2,000,000 recruits ([1]); but he rejected
this option because of its expected negative outcome ([2]); political dissent
stood in the way of raising this army and the required equipment was
lacking. Napoleon ‘most deﬁnitely’ (auf das allerbestimteste) felt the
43Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1983), 3–31.
Other semifactuals employed by Clausewitz include [4], [6], [7] and [25].
44See also counterfactual [8].
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problems related to this option; his analysis was correct, and hence he is not
blamed for rejecting this option.45 Similarly, on 16 June, Marshal Ney had
the means to both drive away the Anglo-Dutch from Quatre Bras and
subsequently fall on the right wing of the Prussians at Ligny [13]; but
because he did not and could not have the situational knowledge to see
this as a viable option, he receives no blame.46
So far, we have seen that Clausewitz uses counterfactuals for the attribu-
tion of responsibility, often in a polemical context; for the assessment of
available options and outcomes; and for a better understanding of the
situational knowledge, the aims, and the means of his historical actors. All
these points are related to the central function of administering praise and
blame, while this activity itself is again frequently expressed in the form of
counterfactuals – in the next section, we will see how this use of evaluative
counterfactuals ﬁts the wider didactic context of Clausewitz’s historical
criticism as explained in On War.
Let us ﬁrst see, however, how the case of Clausewitz relates to a
modern account of the function of historical counterfactuals in historio-
graphy and what the diﬀerences may teach us. In a recent article, Daniel
Nolan lists eight functions; he notes that counterfactuals are used
because: (1) they can invigorate the historical imagination; (2) they help
in bringing out disagreement; (3) they mitigate hindsight bias and
increase the appreciation of historical contingency; (4) we gain inside
understanding when we partake in the counterfactual worries and assess-
ments of historical actors; (5) people are curious about counterfactual
questions, which seems to make them legitimate topics of inquiry in their
own right; (6) historians make causal judgments and (7) they give expla-
nations, and the use of counterfactuals is closely related to these activ-
ities; and (8) counterfactuals can inform the value judgments of
historians, including the assessment of responsibility.47 It is easy to ﬁnd
numerous examples of these points in the Campaign of 1815, but I will
concentrate on two issues.
The most contentious issue is Nolan’s third point: the mitigation of
hindsight bias and the increased appreciation of historical contingency.
This might imply that counterfactuals can be used to make a point
about the contingent versus deterministic character of history in gen-
eral. This function has indeed been ascribed to counterfactuals by Niall
Ferguson and other modern historians. Ferguson gives a brief history of
historical determinism, presents contingent or ‘chaotic’ history as an
alternative, and argues for the anti-determinist function of
45Feldzug § 5, 953/Campaign, 63.
46See also Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 332; Moran, ‘Clausewitz on Waterloo’, 240.
47Daniel Nolan, ‘Why Historians (and everyone else) Should Care About Counterfactuals’, Philosophical
Studies 163 (2013), 333–334.
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counterfactuals.48 But sometimes a historical consequent is the very
contrary of contingent; it is overdetermined. A consequent is overde-
termined when it has multiple antecedents that can each be regarded
as a cause, while already a mere subset of these causes would have
been enough to trigger the consequent. Martin Bunzl and Julian Reiss
have argued that counterfactuals can perform an important function in
solving problems of overdetermination. They can help us to make a
distinction between antecedents that are suﬃciently potent to trigger a
consequent and antecedents that lack this capacity; in this way, histor-
ians use counterfactuals to assess ‘diﬀerence makers’: ‘If antecedent A
had not been the case, consequent C would not have been the case.’49
This means that counterfactuals can be used not only to make a con-
tingent point but also to make an ‘overdetermined’ or ‘determinist’
point.50 In Clausewitz we can indeed observe a perfect agnosticism
about the contingent or determinist character of history as such.51 He
sometimes observes that many options were open to the historical
actors in question, and sometimes that there was an acute paucity of
such options. Sometimes history is very open and sometimes it is very
closed. We have seen that this position by no means impedes a fruitful
use of counterfactuals. Actually, one of Clausewitz’s major reasons for
using counterfactuals in the ﬁrst place, is to understand or to assess
how open or closed a given case actually was; and if he makes a point
about the closed character of a case, he often uses a semifactual: ‘even
if . . . then still.’
While Clausewitz thus give less prominence to the third point in Nolan’s
list of counterfactual functions, the opposite holds for Nolan’s eighth point:
the use of counterfactuals in making value judgments, including the assess-
ment of responsibility. It is interesting to note that this function ﬁgures as
the last item on Nolan’s list, and this is not coincidental. He writes: ‘One use
of counterfactuals for historical purposes that has rarely been focused on in
the recent literature is in the attribution of responsibility, and in the deter-
mination of the appropriateness of regret and pride, and to a lesser extent
praise and blame.’52 Yet, in spite of this apparent modern rarity, we have
seen how evaluative counterfactuals play an essential role in the Campaign
of 1815. Moreover, while Nolan merely aims to present a list of diﬀerent and
only loosely connected counterfactual functions, Clausewitz’s account
shows how diﬀerent counterfactual functions can form an intricate and
48Niall Ferguson, ‘Introduction’ to Virtual History. Alternatives and Counterfactuals (s. l.: Basic Books
1997), 20–88; see also Kaye ‘Challenging Certainty’, 38–43.
49Cf. Bunzl, ‘Counterfactual History’, 857; Julian Reis, ‘Counterfactuals, Thought Experiments, and
Singular Causal Analysis in History,’ Philososophy of Science 76 (2009), 722.
50See Kaye, ‘Challenging Certainty’, 50; Evens, Altered Pasts, 36–37, 61.
51See also Moran, ‘Clausewitz on Waterloo’, 246.
52Nolan, ‘Why Historians Should Care’, 331.
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cohering pattern in which a central position is taken by evaluative judg-
ments. Now that Nolan has helped to bring out this special interest, it may
be useful to consider its conceptual and historical background in
Clausewitz’s case.
Clausewitz’s use of counterfactuals for the attribution of praise and
blame for the assessment of responsibility and for the inside information
about historical actors in the Campaign of 1815 all point to a great
interest in what Daniel Moran describes as ‘the minds of the men who
commanded the armies that fought [this campaign].’53 In no mind is
Clausewitz more interested than in Napoleon’s and he constantly reacts
against Napoleon as actor and as writer of the Mémoires. Napoleon is the
object of intense criticism – although Blücher and, especially, Wellington
are not spared either.54 With his failure to pursue the Prussians after his
victory at Ligny Napoleon squandered his best chance at a decisive
victory (see [15]). This behavior is compared with two previous cases,
which are formulated in similar counterfactual terms and contribute to
the construction of a pattern. If Napoleon had chased the Austrians after
the Battle of Dresden in 1813 and the Prussians after they had been
caught at the Marne in 1814, he would have been able to follow up
partial success with decisive victory. In his later years, he had become
used to military opponents that took ﬂight or became paralyzed after the
ﬁrst blow. He had formed a habit of underestimating and disdaining his
adversaries that contributed to his ﬁnal undoing in 1815.55
Moreover, Clausewitz uses Napoleon’s own Mémoires as ammunition for
an uncanny picture of gradual mental decline with disastrous conse-
quences. He uses Napoleon’s eﬀorts to shift blame to Ney on 16 June
(see [10]) and to Grouchy on 17 June (see [18]) to corroborate a pattern of
vague and hesitant commands: ‘Given all this, it can already be said that
even on the 16th Bonaparte was no longer equal to the task that fate had
imposed upon him.’56 This line of argument is continued on the day of the
Battle of Waterloo on 18 June. Napoleon loses many hours to deploy his
army in a parade-like formation. Clausewitz notes that Napoleon’s
Mémoires betray a puerile pleasure in receiving the accolades of his troops
while riding in front of them. This dismissal of what may have been the last
agreeable moment in Napoleon’s life may betray a certain meanness on
the part of Clausewitz. More serious is his observation that the Emperor
himself seems to have lost faith in the campaign, that with ‘the unneces-
sary assembling and parading of his army’ he hoped to induce
Wellington’s army to a retreat so that, in a striking departure from his
53Moran, ‘Clausewitz on Waterloo’, 240.
54Cf Hahlweg, ‘Vorbemerkung’ to Feldzug, 939.
55Feldzug § 51, 1080.
56Feldzug § 34, 1018/Campaign, 127.
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previous habits, he could evade battle altogether.57 All this conﬁrms for
Clausewitz the impression ‘that something had changed within him.’58 This
mental unraveling contributed to his futile attack on the Anglo-Dutch
center. Due to the unexpected arrival of the Prussians, Napoleon must
have realized that his attack had little chance of success; his decision to
start this attack was an act of ‘sheer desperation.’59 His decision to con-
tinue this attack while defeat was already staring him in his face lacked all
rationality and no longer showed Napoleon as a great man, but ‘like
someone who has broken an instrument and in his anger smashes the
parts to pieces on the ground.’60 Although Clausewitz’s evaluative counter-
factuals in the Campaign of 1815 are used to establish a pattern of personal
hubris and failing leadership, this amounts to more than just a case of old-
fashioned nineteenth-century ‘Great Man’ historiography; but in order to
appreciate that, we need to turn to Clausewitz’s theoretical masterwork.61
Context: on war
In On War Clausewitz explains that the theory of war concerns itself with the
study of ends and means.62 Various factors conspire to make this study a
highly problematic venture: war is driven by complex psychological forces;
these forces tend to interact; and in general all military action has to
proceed in a state of twilight due to a constant lack of information.63
Nevertheless it is possible to formulate a large number of evident proposi-
tions, for instance, that defense is the stronger form of warfare with a
negative purpose while attack is the weaker form with a positive purpose;
and that victory not only implies the conquest of the battle ﬁeld but also the
physical and psychological destruction of the opponent.64 History is an
important tool in the formulation of these rules, if only because it provides
certain limiting conditions: ‘But that is inevitable, since theoretical results
must have been derived from military history or at least checked against
it.’65 Neither here nor elsewhere does Clausewitz provide a precise metho-
dological procedure for the contribution of history to the formulation of
theoretical rules. This is probably because he sees theory very much in the
light of its practical function as an instructive didactic tool, and he is
57Feldzug § 48, 1052–1053/Campaign, 160.
58Ibid., 1058/Campaign, 167.
59Ibid., 1065/Campaign, 173.
60Ibid., 1071/Campaign, 178.
61See Kaye, ‘Challenging Certainty,’ 44–45.
62Vom Kriege II. 1, 277; idem II. 2, 291.
63Vom Kriege II. 2, 288–28; idem II. 3, 303.
64Clausewitz, ‘Nachricht’ in Vom Kriege, 182–183.
65Vom Kriege II.2, 295/On War, 144.
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extremely skeptical about the instructive use of theory in the form of a ﬁxed
set of prescriptive rules.
A military theory should demonstrate its practical use by oﬀering young
oﬃcers reﬂection rather than trivial rules about the extremely complicated
topic of warfare.66 Theory should invite them to an analytic examination that
leads to an understanding of the objects under investigation. There is only
one way to instill this familiarity in pupils even before they engage in direct
operational activities, and that is through a close study of military history.67
History allows the student to relive the decisions of great generals in what
Jon Tetsuro Sumida has called ‘a form of psychological reenactment.’68
Given his didactic aims, it is not surprising that Clausewitz prefers a detailed
historical account of a single campaign to more general surveys, and this in
turn explains his predilection for recent and contemporary history.69 In a
letter of 1829 to Karl von der Gröben, Clausewitz explained that the instruc-
tive aim of his historical writings was the reason why he did not publish his
historical works: ‘I am never afraid to ask the “why” of the “why,” since I do
not aim to write something that is agreeable, but only to seek for myself and
others unquestionable truth and instruction.’70 History also had taught
Clausewitz himself an important lesson. The crushing defeat of Prussia at
the Battle of Jena in 1806 showed to him the danger of the mindless
application of military procedures that had functioned well enough in the
age of Frederick the Great. The antidote against such petriﬁed ‘methodism’
is to develop the critical capabilities (Kritik) of young oﬃcers.
In criticism, history is not used for theory, but theory is used for history –
not so much because theoretical content is brought to bear on history
because criticism is a theoretical method applied to history.71 Historical criti-
cism has three functions: it helps to clarify dubious facts, it contributes to
establishing causal relations, and it inspects (prüfen) means in relation to ends.
There is a clear relation between these functions. It is only thanks to causal
criticism that we are able to isolate the topics that are worthy of evaluative
criticism.72 But the ultimate aim is evaluative criticism, one that contains
‘praise and blame’ (Lob und Tadel) about means and ends.73 It is this evalua-
tive function that enables criticism to be instructive (belehrend).74 Given his
66Ibid., 290.
67Vom Kriege II. 2, 290 and 295. See also idem VIII. 8, 1007.
68Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 100; see also Andres Engberg-Pedersen, Empire of Chance. The
Napoleonic Wars and the Disorder of Things (Cambridge, Massechusetts: Harvard University Press
2015), 136–145.
69Vom Kriege II. 6, 338–340.
70Quoted in Kessel, ‘Zur Genesis,’ 421. See also Hahlweg, ‘Vorbemerkung’ to Feldzug, 937.
71Vom Kriege II. 5, 312–313; cf. Jan Willem Honig, ‘Clausewitz and the Politics of Early Modern Warfare’,
in Andreas Herberg-Rothe (e.a.), Clausewitz. The State and War (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2011),
30.
72Vom Kriege II. 5, 317.
73Ibid., 312.
74Ibid., 314.
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aim of educating young oﬃcers to become future leaders, it is not strange
that Clausewitz concentrates on the actions and decisions of great generals.
And since he ﬁnds it important to judge individuals, he formulates a criterion
of fairness that guides this judgment. The military critic should endeavor to
place himself in the shoes of his historical subject, and only praise or blame
him on account of what he knew or could have known.75 The critic should try
to reproduce the mental activity of his subjects and criticism should use the
same practical language as the subjects that it studies in the midst of their
choices and actions. Only then will criticism exercise its instructive function
and only then will this theoretical tool be adequately applied.
Moreover, if criticism is to exercise its function properly, it needs historical
counterfactuals. Since criticism should have the form of an evaluative judg-
ment about the aims and means of generals, it should not only inspect the
aims that they really formulated and the means that they really used but
also take into consideration the aims that they could have formulated and
the means that they could have used: ‘Critical analysis is not just an evalua-
tion of the ends actually employed, but of all possible means – which have
ﬁrst to be formulated, that is, invented. One can after all, not condemn a
method without being able to suggest a better alternative.’76 A telling
example is the analysis of Napoleon’s performance after defeating the
Austrian Archduke Charles on the Tagliamento in 1797. Clausewitz starts
with the limited perspective of a local military success in Italy and then
zooms out, to evaluate Napoleon’s actions and decisions in an ever-wider
perspective. He includes the strategic level of coordinated action with other
French armies and the level of ultimate political and diplomatic success
against the Austrians. Each level in this subtle hierarchy of possible means
and ends is subjected to rigorous counterfactual analysis.77
Clausewitz’s interest in great men and his eﬀorts at inside knowledge are
indeed typical of nineteenth-century historicism. But we have now seen that
it is possible to give a more speciﬁc context for his use of counterfactuals in
the Campaign of 1815. Counterfactuals form the vital element of a critical
investigation, in analytic sections that often carry the explicit title of
‘Criticism’ or ‘Reﬂection’ (Betrachtung) and are interspersed among more
descriptive sections. In this way, the point made in On War about the
interrelated character of factual, causal, and evaluative criticism is brought
into vivid practice in the Campaign of 1815. Moreover, in On War, the author
explains how his counterfactual criticism is an instrument in the pursuit of
instructive ends; and these ends are indeed vigorously pursued in the
75Ibid., 325–326.
76Vom Kriege II. 5, 321/On War, 161. For other examples of counterfactuals see Vom Kriege III. 12,
394–395; idem VIII. 3, 958 (footnote); idem VIII. 8, 1007; idem VIII. 9, 1024–1027, 1031.
77Vom Kriege II.5, 317–320. See also Catherine Gallagher, ‘The Formalism of Military History’,
Representations 104 (2008), 30–31.
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Campaign of 1815. Facts should be used to draw ‘clear and instructive
conclusions’ (ein klares und lehrreiches Resultat).78 Clausewitz had good
reasons to use this work for teaching the Crown Prince.
Context: military history in general
Although the eight functions ascribed by Nolan (Section 3) to counterfactuals
were formulatedwith the aims of contemporary historians inmind, we have seen
that most of these functions can be clearly distinguished in Clausewitz’s
Campaign of 1815. The instructive function of this work (as further explained in
On War) explains why a central part is played by evaluative historical counter-
factuals that assign praise and blame to individual military leaders. Other kinds of
historical counterfactuals are often used as means toward this end. In that sense,
the Campaign of 1815 serves as a rewarding case for a study of the intricate
patterns formed by the interrelated functions of diﬀerent types of counterfac-
tuals. But why, actually, was it so easy to present the main stages of this account
in counterfactual form? Surely this must be related to the military theme of the
work. One of the ﬁrst truly systematic uses of counterfactuals was indeed made
by an immediate predecessor of Clausewitz, the Welsh oﬃcer and military writer
Henry Lloyd (1718–1783).79 He did not just write a factual history of the cam-
paigns of Frederick the Great, but a critical analysis that may have been a source
of methodological inspiration for Clausewitz. Catherine Gallagher notes that
Lloyd’s critical project entailed three levels of narrative: ‘what happened, what
might have happened, and what should have happened. It is in the last of these
levels that Lloyd comes into the full exercise of his critical powers, and we should
note that when the “ought” narrative begins, unmarked transitions take us into
the realm of the counterfactuals.’80 This perceived aptitude of military history for
counterfactual treatment has remained in view ever since. In 1999 and 2001,
Robert Cowley edited two popular collections of counterfactual history:What If?
The ﬁrst volume consists exclusively of military history (reﬂecting its original
publication inMHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History). The second volume
no longer focuses on military topics, but in the introduction, the editor repeats a
point that he already made in the ﬁrst volume: ‘Armed confrontation provides
counterfactual history with its most natural arena.’81
Various reasons have been given for this aptitude of military history for the
formulation of historical counterfactuals. Bunzl points to the importance of
aims. Counterfactuals explicitly or implicitly ascribe aims to historical actors,
78Feldzug §11, 963/Campaign, 73; see also Feldzug §53, 1089.
79See Henry Lloyd, War, Society and Enlightenment. The Works of General Lloyd, ed. Patrick J. Speelman
(Leiden: Brill, 2005).
80Gallagher, ‘The Formalism’, 26.
81Robert Cowley, ed., What If? (London: Pan Books 2002), xviii; and Cowley, What If? (London: Pan
Books 2001), xiii.
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and counterfactuals can be used to test the rationality of the choices that
were supposed to realize these aims. The advantage of military aims is that
they tend to be clearer than other aims; military aims can often be expressed
unambiguously in terms of winning. If the aims are so clear, then it becomes
easier to construct counterfactuals that study their (lack of) realization. But
Bunzl appreciates that this is by no means an absolute criterion; often military
aims are muddled while nonmilitary aims can be surprisingly clear.82 A more
important reason is suggested by Crowley in the introduction to his ﬁrst
volume of What If?: ‘What ifs can deﬁne true turning points. They can show
that small accidents or split-second decisions are as likely to have major
repercussions as larges ones.’83 Military history seems especially prone to
dramatic turning points, hence its special counterfactual potential.84
But what exactly is a ‘turning point’? We have seen that a counterfactual
consists of antecedents and consequents. Turning points are antecedents that
have dramatic consequents. This means that the construction of a counterfactual
turning point should be understood in terms of what Noel Hendrickson calls ‘the
problem of selecting antecedent scenarios.’85 He starts his ‘plausibility theory’
with the general observation that good counterfactual antecedent scenarios
should be constructed with a minimum of change in the counterfactual history
that is supposed to produce the antecedent in question. This well-known ‘mini-
mal rewrite rule’ is deﬁnedbyHendrickson as ‘the shortest path to the antecedent
that involves no highly improbable individual events (assessed in terms of the
immediately prior events).’86 This is reﬁned to three sub-criteria. The ﬁrst sub-
criterion is the amount of prior history that is perfectly preserved. This indicates
how far back in time events have to be altered in order to produce the posited
counterfactual antecedent in question.87 The second sub-criterion pertains to the
probability of the initial deviation; it should be realistic and plausible. The third
sub-criterion concerns unity: ‘An antecedent scenario is uniﬁed to the extent to
which the history of the antecedent traces back to fewer starting points.’88
Moreover, it should be observed that Hendrickson, like other philosophers of
historical counterfactuality, is interested in a theory that yields ‘intuitively correct
results,’ i.e., a theory that remains close to the intuitions of historians.89
Using Hendrickson’s criteria, it is easy to see how military history can oﬀer
a myriad of counterfactual turning points that are the immediate and
82Bunzl, ‘Counterfactual History’, 852.
83Cowley, What If? (2001) xii.
84See also Kaye, ‘Challenging Certainty’, 52.
85Hendrickson, ‘Counterfactual Reasoning’, 365–386; see also Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin Tetlock,
‘Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological
Perspectives’, in Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press 1996), 16–31.
86Hendrickson, ‘Counterfactual Reasoning’, 377.
87Hendrickson, ‘Counterfactual Reasoning’, 372–373.
88Hendrickson, ‘Counterfactual Reasoning’, 380.
89Hendrickson, ‘Counterfactual Reasoning’, 367–368. See also Reis, ‘Counterfactuals’, 712.
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dramatic results of small contingencies or decisions. This falls under the ﬁrst
criterion (perfectly preserved prior history). It is also easy to see how in a
military campaign, let alone in one battle, a single contingency or decision
can have dramatic results. This falls under the third criterion (unity). The
second criterion on the other hand, probability, has no privileged status in
military history. There is no a priori reason why counterfactuals should be
more probable in this branch of history than in other ﬁelds of history. If the
three criteria for a good counterfactual are indeed close to the common
notions of previous and contemporary historians, and if the ﬁrst and third
criteria form part and parcel of military history in particular, then one would
expect these criteria to remain predominantly implicit in works of military
history, while the more problematic second criterion of probability receives
more explicit attention. This is indeed the case in Clausewitz’s Campaign of
1815. Most of his counterfactuals fulﬁll Hendrickson’s criteria of perfectly
preserved prior history and unity, but the application of these criteria
remains implicit. On the other hand, much of Clausewitz’s critical method
in the Campaign of 1815 is geared toward an investigation of the (im)
probability of its many counterfactuals.
This evaluation of the counterfactual potential of military history in general
and the special case of Clausewitz’s Campaign of 1815 points to a surprisingly
modern relevance of the seemingly antiquated ﬁeld of military history at the
operational level and its preoccupation with the motives and actions of great
generals. The ﬁeld seems indeed to enjoy a modest but no less surprising
renaissance in the judgment of academic scholars. Robert Citino notes about
operational military history: ‘Once dominated by personalist modes of analysis
that consisted almost exclusively of blaming General X for zigging when he
should have zagged, or turning left when he should have turned right, it is now
much more likely to emphasize systematic factors: the uncertainty of the battle-
ﬁeld (often metaphorically expressed, per Carl (. . .) von Clausewitz, as the “fog of
war”), the ever-present problems of information-gathering and -sharing, and the
inherently asymmetric nature of war. As historians in all ﬁelds seem increasingly
willing to recognize the role of contingency, chance, andeven “chaos” in historical
development, operational military historians ﬁnd themselves in the unusual
position of being well ahead of the scholarly curve: they have been talking
about all of these things for years.’90 Clausewitz himself made signiﬁcant con-
tributions to all these ‘systematic factors’ and this explainsmuch of his continuing
relevance – although the contemporary enthusiasm generated by these topics
has led to confusions that cannot be ascribed to himself. Allan Beyerchenwrote a
classic article on the role of chaos and nonlinear processes and their role as
impediments to the formulation of a theory of war in On War, but his thesis has
90Robert Citino, ‘Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,’ American Historical Review 112
(2007) 1079; see also Gallagher, ‘The Formalism,’ 32.
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met with serious and pertinent criticism.91 Terence Holmes puts the role of chaos
into perspective by arguing that Clausewitz, although he appreciates the com-
plicating inﬂuence of friction and interaction, still maintains that a military genius
will be able to predict the reactions of his opponents and include these in his
plans – so chaos does notmake planning impossible.92 In addition, Paul Roth and
Thomas Ryckman answer Beyerchen with the more fundamental observation
that chaos theory consists of value terms and concepts that ‘have a speciﬁcally
precise meaning only within the conﬁnes of mathematical theory,’ which means
that ‘the promised beneﬁts of chaos theory vis-à-vis history are either fantastic or,
at best, an extremely loose heuristic.’93 Moreover, we have already noted how
some historians tend to compound these problems, by using notions of chaos
and contingency in conjunction with counterfactuals for anti-determinist claims
about the nature of history. On this account as well, Clausewitz shows an endur-
ing relevance. He does not use counterfactuals tomake claims about the open or
closed character of history, but rather puts them to instructive use as part of a
critical method that evaluates the possibilities of means and ends in individual
cases, even if this means the use of Citino’s ‘personalist modes of analysis’ that
consist of ‘blaming General X for zigging when he should have zagged.’94
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Map 1. The Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815.95
Map 2. The Battle of Waterloo, 18 June 1815.96
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